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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiffs Jennifer Sweda, Benjamin Wiggins, Robert 
Young, Faith Pickering, Pushkar Sohoni, and Rebecca Toner, 
representing a class of participants in the University of 
Pennsylvania’s 403(b) defined contribution, individual 
account, employee pension benefit plan, sued Defendants, the 
University of Pennsylvania and its appointed fiduciaries, for 
breach of fiduciary duty, prohibited transactions, and failure to 
monitor fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Plaintiffs 
(collectively, “Sweda”) alleged that Defendants (collectively, 
“Penn”), among other things, failed to use prudent and loyal 
decision making processes regarding investments and 
administration, overpaid certain fees by up to 600%, and failed 
to remove underperforming options from the retirement plan’s 
offerings. The District Court dismissed Sweda’s complaint in 
its entirety. We will reverse the District Court’s dismissal of 
the breach of fiduciary duty claims at Counts III and V only 
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and remand for further proceedings.    
I. 
Sweda and her fellow Plaintiffs-Appellants are current 
and former Penn employees who participate, or participated, in 
Penn’s retirement plan (the “Plan”). They sought to represent 
the proposed class of Plan participants, 20,000 current and 
former Penn employees who had participated in the Plan since 
August 10, 2010. The Defendants are the University of 
Pennsylvania, its Investment Committee, and Jack Heuer, the 
University’s Vice President of Human Resources. The Plan is 
a defined contribution plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34), tax 
qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b). The University matches 
employees’ contributions up to 5% of compensation. 
As a 403(b), the Plan offers mutual funds and annuities: 
the former through TIAA-CREF and Vanguard Group, Inc. 
and the latter through TIAA-CREF. Since 2010, the Plan has 
offered as many as 118 investment options. As of December 
2014, the Plan offered 78 options: 48 Vanguard mutual funds, 
and 30 TIAA-CREF options including mutual funds, fixed and 
variable annuities, and an insurance company separate account. 
Effective October 19, 2012, Penn organized its investment 
fund lineup into four tiers. The TIAA-CREF and Vanguard 
options under Tier 1 consisted of lifecycle or target-date funds 
for the “Do-it-for-me” investor. Certain core funds were 
designated Tier 2, designed for the “Help-me-do-it” investor 
looking to be involved in his or her investment choices without 
having to decide among too many options. Under Tier 3, the 
Plan offered an “expanded menu of funds” for “the more 
advanced ‘mix-my-own’ investor,” and under Tier 4, the Plan 
offered the option of a brokerage account window for the “self-
directed” investor looking for additional options, subject to 
additional fees. Plan participants thereafter could “select a 
 6 
combination of funds from any or all of the investment tiers.” 
At the end of 2014, the Plan had $3.8 billion in assets: $2.5 
billion invested in TIAA-CREF options, and $1.3 billion 
invested in Vanguard options. 
TIAA-CREF and Vanguard charge investment and 
administrative (recordkeeping) fees. Mutual fund investment 
fees are charged as a percentage of a fund’s managed assets, 
known as the expense ratio, and the rate can differ by share 
class. The mutual funds in which the Plan invests have two 
share classes: retail and institutional. Retail class shares 
generally have higher investment fees than institutional class 
shares. There are also two common recordkeeping fee models. 
In a flat fee model, recordkeeping fees are a set amount per 
participant, whereas in a revenue sharing model, part of an 
option’s expense ratio is diverted to administrative service 
providers. TIAA-CREF and Vanguard charged the Plan under 
the revenue sharing model.   
Sweda alleged numerous breaches of fiduciary duty and 
prohibited transactions. She brought six counts against all 
Defendants, and one count against the University. The first six 
counts alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in violation of 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (Counts I, III, and V) and prohibited 
transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (Counts II, 
IV, and VI). Sweda also alleged that the University failed to 
adequately monitor its appointed fiduciaries in Count VII. 
 Penn moved to dismiss the complaint, and the District 
Court granted the motion. The court determined that Sweda 
failed to state a claim for fiduciary breach under Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 
671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011), because her factual allegations 
could also indicate rational conduct. As for the prohibited 
transaction claims, the court held that the service agreements 
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could not constitute prohibited transactions without an 
allegation that Penn had the subjective intent to benefit a party 
in interest. The court dismissed Count VII after determining 
that it was duplicative of the claims at Counts I, III, and V.1 
Sweda now appeals.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and (f). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conduct plenary 
review of an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (12)(b)(6). 
Renfro, 671 F.3d at 320; Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 
F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. 
A. Pleadings standards for claims brought under ERISA    
 The question in this case is whether Sweda stated a 
claim that should survive termination at the earliest stage in 
litigation. When a court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6), it deprives a plaintiff of the benefit of the 
court’s adjudication of the merits of its claim before the court 
considers any evidence. That is why, in exercising our plenary 
review, we apply the same standard as the district court and 
construe the complaint “in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff,” Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John 
Hancock Life Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), to determine 
                                              
1 Sweda does not address the District Court’s dismissal 
of Count VII in her opening brief. Therefore, the District 
Court’s dismissal of Count VII is not before us on appeal. 
Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dir. of the Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 
F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017).  
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whether it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[W]e disregard 
rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal 
conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.” James v. City 
of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012). A claim 
“has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Thompson v. Real Estate 
Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the District Court held that Sweda’s complaint did 
not state a plausible claim, observing at various points in its 
memorandum that “[a]s in Twombly, the actions are at least 
‘just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and 
competitive business strategy’ in the market as they are with a 
fiduciary breach.” Sweda v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, No. CV 16-
4329, 2017 WL 4179752, at *7, 8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017) 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554). However, Twombly’s 
discussion of alleged misconduct that is “just as much in line 
with a wide swath of rational and competitive business 
strategy” is specific to antitrust cases. 550 U.S. at 554. In an 
antitrust case, “a conclusory allegation of agreement at some 
unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show 
illegality,” therefore “when allegations of parallel conduct are 
set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a 
context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not 
merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent 
action.” Id. at 557.  
One of our sister circuits has declined to extend 
Twombly’s antitrust pleading rule to breach of fiduciary duty 
claims under ERISA because “[r]equiring a plaintiff to rule out 
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every possible lawful explanation for the conduct he 
challenges would invert the principle that the complaint is 
construed most favorably to the nonmoving party.” Braden v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 597 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We agree, and 
decline to extend Twombly’s antitrust pleading rule to such 
claims. To the extent that the District Court required Sweda to 
rule out lawful explanations for Penn’s conduct, it erred. 
We now turn to the task of evaluating Sweda’s 
complaint. We progress in three steps: First, we will note the 
elements of a claim; second, we will identify allegations that 
are conclusory and therefore not assumed to be true, and; third, 
accepting the factual allegations as true, we will view them and 
reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most 
favorable to Sweda to decide whether “they plausibly give rise 
to an entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 
809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
679).2 Pleadings that establish only a mere possibility of 
misconduct do not show entitlement to relief. Fowler, 578 F.3d 
at 211.  
In our evaluation of the complaint, we must account for 
the fact that Rule 8(a)(2), Twombly, and Iqbal operate with 
contextual specificity. Renfro, 671 F.3d at 321 (“[W]e must 
examine the context of a claim, including the underlying 
substantive law, in order to assess its plausibility.”). Therefore, 
ERISA’s purpose informs our assessment of Sweda’s 
                                              
2 We have also described this as a two-step analysis, but 
the task is the same. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (the court (1) separates factual and 
legal elements of a claim and takes the well-pleaded factual 
allegations as true, and (2) determines whether those facts state 
a plausible claim for relief).  
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pleadings. ERISA’s protective function is the focal point of the 
statute. The statute plainly states that ERISA is a response to 
“the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards 
concerning [employee benefit plans’] operation,” and adds that 
ERISA reflects Congress’s desire “that disclosure be made and 
safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, 
operation, and administration of such plans.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001(a). This Court has repeatedly acknowledged and 
affirmed ERISA’s protective function. See e.g. McCann v. 
Unum Provident, 907 F.3d 130, 143 (3d Cir. 2018); Edmonson 
v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 81 (3d Cir. 2012). 
ERISA furthers “the national public interest in safeguarding 
anticipated employee benefits” upon which individuals’ 
livelihoods depend. Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 529 (3d 
Cir. 1979).   
 ERISA also “represents a careful balancing between 
ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan 
and the encouragement of the creation of such plans.” Fifth 
Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2470 (2014) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); In re Unisys 
Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996) (ERISA 
“protect[s] and strengthen[s] the rights of employees” and 
“encourage[s] the development of private retirement plans.”). 
Plan sponsors and fiduciaries have reliance interests in the 
courts’ interpretation of ERISA when establishing plan 
management practices. ERISA “‘induc[es] employers to offer 
benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities.’” Renfro, 
671 F.3d at 321 (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 
536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002)). Both pursuits—participant 
protection and plan creation—are important considerations at 
the pleadings stage.  
 Two sections of the statute are particularly important to 
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this appeal: the section outlining fiduciary duties, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104, and the section prohibiting certain transactions, id. 
§ 1106. Under § 1104(a), fiduciaries are held to the prudent 
man standard of care,3 which is drawn from trust law. Tibble v. 
Edison Int'l (Tibble III), 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015); In re 
Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434 (“Congress has instructed that section 
1104 ‘in essence, codifies and makes applicable to … 
fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the 
law of trusts.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 127, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1974)). Section 1104(a) lays the foundation of fiduciary duty, 
and § 1106(a) “[s]upplement[s] that foundational obligation” 
by “erect[ing] a categorical bar to transactions between the 
plan and a ‘party in interest’ deemed likely to injure the plan.” 
Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc., 700 F.3d at 82.  
 The standards for fiduciary conduct in §§ 1104 and 
1106 may overlap. When evaluating whether there has been a 
breach of fiduciary duties under § 1104, courts may consider 
the administrator’s need to “defray[] reasonable expenses of 
administering [a] plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii). A 
prohibited transactions claim under § 1106 might also involve 
expense-related transactions between a plan and party in 
interest. Id. § 1106(a)(1)(C). Despite the overlap, a fiduciary 
who breaches the duties under § 1104(a) does not necessarily 
violate § 1106(a). Because Sweda alleged that Penn breached 
its fiduciary duties and caused the Plan to engage in prohibited 
transactions, we will first address claims under § 1104(a)(1) 
                                              
3 The duties in § 1104(a) fully apply to all fiduciaries 
except fiduciaries of Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs). Fifth Third Bancorp, 134 S. Ct. at 2467. Neither 
ESOPs nor the fiduciary duties accompanying them are at issue 
in this case.  
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(Counts I, III, and V), and then address her claims under 
§ 1106(a)(1) (Counts II, IV, and VI).  
B. Section 1104(a)(1) claims (Counts I, III, and V)  
1. Elements of a claim under § 1104(a)(1)  
In reviewing the District Court’s dismissal of Sweda’s 
fiduciary breach claims, our first task is to identify the elements 
of such a claim. They are: “(1) a plan fiduciary (2) breaches an 
ERISA-imposed duty (3) causing a loss to the plan.” Leckey v. 
Stefano, 501 F.3d 212, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2007), as amended 
(Dec. 21, 2007). Because the parties do not dispute that Penn 
is a fiduciary or whether loss was adequately alleged, our focus 
is whether Sweda adequately alleged that Penn breached its 
fiduciary duties. A fiduciary must “discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing 
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and . . . 
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), (a)(1)(A). As explained above, fiduciaries 
are held to the “prudent man” standard of care, which requires 
fiduciaries to exercise “the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with 
like aims.” Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Fiduciaries are also required to 
diversify investments unless it would be imprudent,4 and to 
administer the plan according to governing documents and 
instruments. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C), (D). Fiduciaries are 
personally liable for losses due to breach. Id. § 1109(a). 
 A fiduciary must prudently select investments, and 
                                              
4 ESOP fiduciaries are exempted from the general duty 
to diversify. Fifth Third Bancorp, 134 S. Ct. at 2467.   
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failure to “monitor . . . investments and remove imprudent 
ones” may constitute a breach. See Tibble III, 135 S. Ct. at 
1828-29; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i) (fiduciaries 
must give “appropriate consideration to those facts and 
circumstances that . . . the fiduciary knows or should know are 
relevant to the particular investment or investment course of 
action involved”); see also Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 
F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“investigation of the merits of 
a particular investment is at the heart of the prudent person 
standard”). Fiduciaries must also understand and monitor plan 
expenses. “Expenses, such as management or administrative 
fees, can sometimes significantly reduce the value of an 
account in a defined-contribution plan,” Tibble III, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1826, by decreasing its immediate value, and by depriving 
the participant of the prospective value of funds that would 
have continued to grow if not taken out in fees. Recognizing 
the substantial impact of a fiduciary’s choice among fee 
options, the Ninth Circuit, in Tibble v. Edison Int’l (Tibble II), 
affirmed the district court’s finding that the plan fiduciary’s 
inclusion of retail class shares of three funds when institutional 
class shares of the same funds were available for 24 to 40 fewer 
basis points, was a fiduciary breach. 729 F.3d 1110, 1137-39 
(9th Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1823 
(2015).  
 Cognizant of the impact of fees on Plan value, 
fiduciaries should be vigilant in “negotiation of the specific 
formula and methodology” by which fee payments such as 
“revenue sharing will be credited to the plan and paid back to 
the plan or to plan service providers.” DOL Advisory Opinion 
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2013-03A, 2013 WL 3546834, at *4.5 Fiduciaries must also 
consider a plan’s “power . . . to obtain favorable investment 
products, particularly when those products are substantially 
identical—other than their lower cost—to products the trustee 
has already selected.” Tibble v. Edison Int’l (Tibble IV), 843 
F.3d 1187, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016). See Tibble II, 729 F.3d at 1137 
n.24 (common knowledge that investment minimums are often 
waived for large plans). When expenses are paid from plan 
assets, fiduciaries must ensure that the assets are used “for the 
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and 
beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan.” DOL Advisory Opinion 2001-01A, 
2001 WL 125092, at *1. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).  
Bearing these fiduciary duties in mind, a court assesses 
                                              
5 Under ERISA Procedure 76-1 § 10, only the parties 
described in a request for a DOL advisory opinion may rely on 
the opinion, and only to the extent that the problem is fully and 
accurately described in the request. Advisory Op. Procedure, 
41 Fed. Reg. 36281-02 (August 27, 1976). The opinions do not 
have precedential effect. “Because of the nature and limitations 
of these rulings,” the Supreme Court declined to “express [a] 
view as to whether they are or are not entitled to deference” in 
Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 162 n.3 
(1993). Such advisory opinions are likely “entitled to respect” 
to the extent that they have the “power to persuade” under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944). Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 
(2000) (citations omitted). See e.g. Caremark, Inc. v. Goetz, 
480 F.3d 779, 790 (6th Cir. 2007) (deference to DOL advisory 
opinion was warranted because of the opinion’s persuasive 
force and its consistency with federal and state law and 
regulations).  
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a fiduciary’s performance by looking at process rather than 
results, “focusing on a fiduciary's conduct in arriving at [a] . . . 
decision . . . and asking whether a fiduciary employed the 
appropriate methods to investigate and determine the merits of 
a particular investment.” In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434 (citations 
omitted). A fiduciary’s process must bear the marks of loyalty, 
skill, and diligence expected of an expert in the field. It is not 
enough to avoid misconduct, kickback schemes, and bad-faith 
dealings. The law expects more than good intentions. “[A] pure 
heart and an empty head are not enough.” DiFelice v. U.S. 
Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 418 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 
1983)). Many allegations concerning fiduciary conduct, such 
as reasonableness of “compensation for services” are 
“inherently factual question[s]” for which neither ERISA nor 
the Department of Labor give specific guidance. DOL 
Advisory Opinion 2013-03A, 2013 WL 3546834, at *4-5.  
 In Renfro, we established the pleading standard for 
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA after examining the 
reasoning of other Circuits that had addressed the issue in light 
of Twombly and Iqbal, particularly Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 
F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009), and Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 
588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009). The Renfro plaintiffs challenged 
the mix and range of investment options in their retirement 
plan, the use of asset-based rather than per-participant fees, and 
the alleged imbalance of the fees charged and services 
rendered. 671 F.3d at 326. The district court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that “the plan offered a 
sufficient mix of investments . . . [such] that no rational trier of 
fact could find, on the basis of the facts alleged in the operative 
complaint, that the . . . defendants breached an ERISA 
fiduciary duty by offering [that] particular array of investment 
vehicles.” Id. at 320 (citations and internal quotation marks 
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omitted).  
 We affirmed. Id. at 327-28. We determined that we 
could not “infer from what [was] alleged that the [fiduciary’s] 
process was flawed.” Id. at 327 (quoting Braden, 588 F.3d at 
596). We held that ERISA plans should offer meaningful 
choices to their participants, and that: 
[T]he range of investment options 
and the characteristics of those 
included options—including the 
risk profiles, investment strategies, 
and associated fees—are highly 
relevant and readily ascertainable 
facts against which the plausibility 
of claims challenging the overall 
composition of a plan's mix and 
range of investment options should 
be measured. 
Id. We explained that a fiduciary breach claim must be 
examined against the backdrop of the mix and range of 
available investment options. Id. We did not hold, however, 
that a meaningful mix and range of investment options 
insulates plan fiduciaries from liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty. Such a standard would allow a fiduciary to avoid liability 
by stocking a plan with hundreds of options, even if the 
majority were overpriced or underperforming. One important 
reason why we cannot read Renfro to establish such a bright-
line rule (that providing a range of investment options satisfies 
a fiduciary’s duty) is that ERISA fiduciaries have a duty to act 
prudently according to current practices—as the statute puts it, 
the “circumstances then prevailing.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1)(B). Practices change over time, and bright line 
rules would hinder courts’ evaluation of fiduciaries’ 
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performance against contemporary industry practices. Bearing 
these things in mind, we turn to Sweda’s complaint to 
determine whether she adequately alleged fiduciary breach in 
Counts I, III, and V.  
2. Conclusory allegations of fiduciary breach    
First, we must eliminate conclusory allegations from the 
complaint. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. Sweda included a few 
conclusory allegations, such as “a prudent process would have 
produced a different outcome,” Am. Compl. ¶75, but 
conclusory statements of that variety are rare in the complaint, 
and after discarding them, many well-pleaded factual 
allegations remain.  
3. Well-pleaded facts alleging breach of fiduciary duty   
Sweda alleged that Penn was “responsible for hiring 
administrative service providers, such as a recordkeeper, and 
negotiating and approving those service providers’ 
compensation.” Am. Compl. ¶36. She also alleged that Penn 
was responsible for the menu of investment options available 
to participants. Id. In Count I, she alleged that Penn entered a 
“lock-in” agreement with TIAA-CREF that mandated 
inclusion of the CREF Stock and Money Market accounts, and 
required the Plan to use TIAA-CREF as a recordkeeper. Am. 
Compl. ¶86.  
In Count III, Sweda alleged that Penn paid excessive 
administrative fees, failed to solicit bids from service 
providers, failed to monitor revenue sharing, failed to leverage 
the Plan’s size to obtain lower fees or rebates, and failed to 
comprehensively review Plan management. Specifically, 
Sweda alleged that the Plan paid between $4.5 and $5.5 million 
in annual recordkeeping fees at a time when similar plans paid 
$700,000 to $750,000 for the same services. Sweda also 
alleged that percentage-based fees went up as assets grew, 
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despite there being no corresponding increase in recordkeeping 
services. Sweda alleged that Penn could have negotiated for a 
cap on fees or renegotiated the fee structure, but failed to do 
either. Sweda also alleged that Penn could have assessed the 
reasonableness of Plan recordkeeping fees by soliciting 
competitive bids, but, unlike prudent fiduciaries, failed to do 
so. For contrast, Sweda offered examples of similarly situated 
fiduciaries who acted prudently, such as fiduciaries at Loyola 
Marymount who hired an independent consultant to request 
recordkeeping proposals and consolidated services with a 
single provider. Sweda pointed to similar moves at Pepperdine, 
Purdue, and CalTech, as well as Caltech’s negotiation for $15 
million in revenue sharing rebates. Sweda alleged that unlike 
those organizations, Penn failed to review Plan management, 
and fell behind other fiduciaries in the industry. 
 In Count V, Sweda alleged that Penn breached its 
fiduciary duties by: paying unreasonable investment fees, 
including and retaining high-cost investment options with 
historically poor performance compared to available 
alternatives, and retaining multiple options in the same asset 
class and investment style. Specifically, Sweda alleged that 
despite the availability of low-cost institutional class shares, 
Penn selected and retained identically managed but higher cost 
retail class shares. She included a table comparing options in 
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the Plan with the readily available cheaper alternatives.6 Sweda 
also alleged that some options in the line-up had layers of 
unnecessary fees. Not only did Sweda allege that the options 
Penn selected and retained were imprudently costly, she also 
alleged that they were duplicative thereby decreasing the value 
of actively managed funds, reducing the Plan’s leverage, and 
confusing participants. Sweda also alleged that 60% of Plan 
options underperformed appropriate benchmarks, and that 
Penn failed to remove underperformers. Sweda pointed to the 
CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Account as 
examples of consistent underperformers. She alleged that 
Penn’s process of selecting and managing options must have 
been flawed if Penn retained expensive underperformers over 
                                              
6 Most of the investment options Sweda criticized in her 
complaint were designated as Tier 3 and Tier 4 options. Sweda 
also criticized Tier 2 options such as the TIAA-CREF 
International Equity Index Fund, listed in Sweda’s table 
comparing Plan options with their “lower-cost, but otherwise 
identical” alternatives. Sweda confirmed that criticized options 
fell under Tiers 2, 3, and 4 at oral argument. Oral Arg. at 7:33. 
At this time we do not address whether Penn may be able to 
assert a defense to liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) due to 
participants’ self-directed investing activity. The § 1104(c) 
safe harbor defense is an affirmative defense and therefore it is 
generally not part of a court’s consideration of a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), except where the defense has 
been anticipated by a plaintiff’s complaint. Hecker, 556 F.3d 
at 588 (citing In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 446 for the classification 
of § 1104(c) as an affirmative defense). Unlike the plaintiffs in 
Hecker who explicitly and “thoroughly anticipated” the safe 
harbor defense, Sweda did not “put it in play” at the pleadings 
stage. Id. 
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better performing, cheaper alternatives. At this stage, her 
factual allegations must be taken as true, and every reasonable 
inference from them must be drawn in her favor. Connelly, 809 
F.3d at 790.  
4. Sweda plausibly stated a claim in Counts III and V  
 At this final step, we employ a holistic approach, 
considering all of Sweda’s well-pleaded factual allegations 
including the range of investment options alongside other 
germane factors such as reasonableness of fees, selection and 
retention of investment options, and practices of similarly 
situated fiduciaries, to determine whether her allegations 
plausibly demonstrate entitlement to relief. See Renfro, 671 
F.3d at 327; see also Braden, 588 F.3d at 598 (statute’s 
remedial scheme “counsel[s] careful and holistic evaluation of 
an ERISA complaint’s factual allegations before concluding 
that they do not support a plausible inference that the plaintiff 
is entitled to relief.”). The complaint should not be “parsed 
piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in 
isolation, is plausible.” Braden, 588 F.3d at 594. See Tatum v. 
RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 360 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(citing DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 420) (courts must look to the 
totality of the circumstances to assess the prudence of 
investment decisions). 
 Sweda plausibly alleged breach of fiduciary duty. 
Sweda’s factual allegations are not merely “unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678. As recounted above, they are numerous and 
specific factual allegations that Penn did not perform its 
fiduciary duties with the level of care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence to which Plan participants are statutorily entitled 
under § 1104(a)(1). Sweda offered specific comparisons 
between returns on Plan investment options and readily 
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available alternatives, as well as practices of similarly situated 
fiduciaries to show what plan administrators “acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would [do] in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.” 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).7 The allegations plausibly allege 
that Penn failed to “defray[] reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan” and otherwise failed to “discharge [its] 
duties” according to the prudent man standard of care. Id. 
§ 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B).  
 Other appellate courts have found that similar conduct 
plausibly indicates breach of fiduciary duty. For instance, in 
Tussey v. ABB, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that the district 
court did not err in finding fiduciaries breached their duties by 
“[failing to] (1) calculate the amount the Plan was paying [the 
recordkeeper] for recordkeeping through revenue sharing, (2) 
determine whether [the recordkeeper’s] pricing was 
competitive, [or] (3) adequately leverage the Plan's size to 
reduce fees,” among other things. 746 F.3d 327, 336 (8th Cir. 
                                              
7 Sweda also directly compared fees on options included 
in the Plan with readily available lower-cost options. The 
dissent suggests that because the range of fees on options 
included in the Plan is lower than the range of challenged fees 
in Renfro, Sweda needed to allege a change in market 
circumstances since Renfro was decided to state a plausible 
claim. In making that suggestion, the dissent misses the object 
of our inquiry, that is, Penn’s “conduct in arriving at an 
investment decision.” In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434 (citations 
omitted). To that end, the allegations in Sweda’s complaint 
show that Penn frequently selected higher cost investments 
when identical lower-cost investments were available. This is 
one of many allegations that, together, plausibly allege that 
Penn breached its fiduciary duty.  
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2014). In Tibble IV, the Ninth Circuit held that whether a 
fiduciary breached its fiduciary duties by selecting a higher 
cost share class was an issue requiring development by the 
district court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
843 F.3d at 1197-98. 
 In dismissing the claims in Counts III and V, the District 
Court erred by “ignor[ing] reasonable inferences supported by 
the facts alleged,” and by drawing “inferences in [Defendants’] 
favor, faulting [Plaintiffs] for failing to plead facts tending to 
contradict those inferences.” Braden, 588 F.3d at 595. While 
Sweda may not have directly alleged how Penn mismanaged 
the Plan, she provided substantial circumstantial evidence from 
which the District Court could “reasonably infer” that a breach 
had occurred. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent 
Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. 
Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 718 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Based on her allegations, the claims 
in Counts III and V should not have been dismissed.  
 Penn argues that allowing Sweda to proceed on this 
complaint ignores fiduciary discretion, and also argues that it 
in fact employed a prudent process in its Plan management. 
Finally, Penn argues that reversal would overexpose ERISA 
fiduciaries to liability. According to Penn, ERISA fiduciaries 
are “afforded a healthy measure of discretion in deciding what 
is in the plan participants’ interests.” Br. of Appellees at 2. At 
oral argument, Penn emphasized fiduciary discretion, calling it 
the “hallmark of fiduciary activity.” Oral Arg. at 25:05. Penn 
is not incorrect that the exercise of discretionary authority over 
plan assets is a characteristic of fiduciaries such that courts can 
identify fiduciaries by this trait, see Pohl v. Nat'l Benefits 
Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992), nor is 
Penn incorrect that discretion is an important aspect of 
fiduciary behavior that the courts should consider in evaluating 
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fiduciary performance. ERISA fiduciaries, like trustees, are 
afforded discretion because “[t]here are no universally 
accepted and enduring theories of financial markets or 
prescriptions for investment that can provide clear and specific 
guidance,” therefore “[v]aried approaches to the prudent 
investment” of assets are permissible. Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts § 90 (2007), cmt. f.  
 However, while fiduciaries have discretion in plan 
management, that discretion is bounded by the prudent man 
standard. Discretion “does not mean . . . that the legal standard 
of prudence is without substantive content or that there are no 
principles by which the fiduciary's conduct may be guided and 
judged,” rather a fiduciary’s conduct at all times “must be 
reasonably supported in concept and must be implemented 
with proper care, skill, and caution.” Id. Fiduciary discretion 
must be exercised within the statutory parameters of prudence 
and loyalty. See DOL Advisory Op. 2006-08A, 2006 WL 
2990326, at *3. Those parameters impose a fiduciary standard 
that is considered “the highest known to the law.” Tatum, 761 
F.3d at 355–56 (quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 
272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)). See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 
489, 497 (1996) (ERISA fiduciary duty may even exceed 
fiduciary duty as derived from the common law of trusts). 
Therefore, while we recognize and appreciate fiduciary 
discretion, if there is indeed a “hallmark” of fiduciary activity 
identified in the statute, it is prudence. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).  
 As to Penn’s second argument, that it did in fact employ 
a prudent process, this argument goes to the merits and is 
misplaced at this early stage. Although Penn may be able to 
demonstrate that its process was prudent, we are not permitted 
to accept Penn’s account of the facts or draw inferences in 
Penn’s favor at this stage of litigation. Finally, we address 
Penn’s argument, supported by amici including the American 
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Council on Education and the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America8, that allowing Sweda’s complaint 
through the 12(b)(6) gate will overexpose plan sponsors and 
fiduciaries to costly litigation and will discourage them from 
offering benefit plans at all. Br. of Appellees at 38. Penn 
predicts that reversal would “give class action lawyers a free 
ticket to discovery and the opportunity to demand extortionate 
settlements.” Id.9 Penn’s solution is to interpret Renfro to mean 
that if a plan fiduciary provides a “mix and range of investment 
options,” plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege breach of fiduciary 
                                              
8 As well as the American Association of State Colleges 
and Universities (AASCU), Association of American 
Universities (AAU), Association of Community College 
Trustees (ACCT), Association of Public and Land Grant 
Universities (APLU), College and University Professional 
Association for Human Resources (CUPA-HR), Council of 
Independent Colleges (CIC), National Association of 
Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), and the 
American Benefits Council.  
9 The dissent also expresses concern that reversal will 
overexpose university sponsors and volunteer fiduciaries to 
class action claims designed to yield large settlements and 
significant attorneys’ fees. The dissent fears that universities 
will be less likely to offer benefit plans and fiduciaries less 
likely to volunteer their services. If that is the case, we should 
leave it to Congress to address the possibility of a different 
fiduciary standard that is suitable to the goal of inducing 
universities to offer plans and would-be fiduciaries to 
volunteer. As it stands, ERISA fiduciaries are held to one 
standard under § 1104 and we cannot adjust our pleadings 
standards to accommodate subcategories of sponsors and 
fiduciaries.   
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duty.  
 The Supreme Court addressed a nearly identical 
concern in Fifth Third Bancorp. There, the defendants 
“[sought] relief from what they believe[d were] meritless, 
economically burdensome lawsuits.” 134 S. Ct. at 2470. The 
Court explained that while Congress, through ERISA, sought 
to encourage creation of retirement plans, that purpose was not 
intended to prevent participants with meritorious claims from 
gaining access to the courts. Id. While Fifth Third concerned 
an ESOP plan and defendants’ request for a presumption of 
prudence, its reasoning is apt here. Despite our appreciation of 
Penn and amici’s fear of frivolous litigation, if we were to 
interpret Renfro to bar a complaint as detailed and specific as 
the complaint here, we would insulate from liability every 
fiduciary who, although imprudent, initially selected a “mix 
and range” of investment options. Neither the statute nor our 
precedent justifies such a rule. We will therefore reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal of the claims in Counts III and V, 
and remand for further proceedings.10   
                                              
10 The dissent argues that we ought to affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Count V for Sweda’s want of 
constitutional standing under Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 2013). The dissent argues that 
because Sweda conceded that most of the underperforming 
options are in Tiers 3 and 4, the plaintiffs should have included 
information about whether they invested in Tier 3 or Tier 4 
options in the complaint. In the dissent’s view, plaintiffs’ 
failure to include that information constitutes a failure to allege 
an injury in fact. However, while the complaint does not 
identify plaintiffs’ investment options by tier, it does contain 
facts that indicate that the named plaintiffs invested in the 
underperforming investment options. In a paragraph entitled 
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“Standing” in the complaint, Sweda included the following 
information:  
 
To the extent the Plaintiffs must 
also show an individual injury . . . 
each Plaintiff has suffered such an 
injury, in at least the following 
ways . . . The named Plaintiffs’ 
individual accounts in the Plan 
were further harmed by 
Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary 
duties because one or more of the 
named Plaintiffs during the 
proposed class period (1) invested 
in underperforming options 
including the CREF Stock and 
TIAA Real Estate accounts[.]  
 
App. 36-37. This allegation links the named plaintiffs 
with the underperforming investment options and is sufficient 
to show individual injuries.  
In light of the dissent’s point on constitutional standing, 
we should address the issue as it pertains to participants and 
beneficiaries who bring a civil action against fiduciaries under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). The dissent cites this Court’s decision 
in Perelman v. Perelman, where we held that participants in a 
defined benefit plan could not show actual injury for 
constitutional standing for an § 1132(a)(3) claim by pointing 
to a “diminution of plan assets” because such participants are 
entitled to a fixed periodic payment rather than part of the asset 
pool. 793 F.3d 368, 374 (3d Cir. 2015). We also noted that 
“[t]here is no question that representative suits by plan 
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 We will affirm dismissal of Count I because it is time 
barred. Fairview Twp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 773 F.2d 
517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985) (we may affirm on any basis). 
Sweda limited her claim to the initial agreement between the 
Plan and TIAA-CREF to include the CREF Stock and Money 
Market accounts in the Plan, and to use TIAA-CREF for 
recordkeeping. This agreement was entered into prior to 
December 31, 2009, and Sweda filed her initial complaint on 
August 10, 2016. Sweda did not present this claim as an 
ongoing breach like the petitioners in Tibble III, 135 S. Ct. 
1823. Although we must draw every reasonable inference in 
Sweda’s favor, we will not read factual allegations into a 
complaint. Count I is therefore time barred under the six-year 
statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1).11  
                                              
participants or beneficiaries against fiduciaries for breach of 
fiduciary duty are permitted by, and generally brought under, 
ERISA § [1132(a)(2)].” Id. at 376 n.6. This case implicates the 
latter part of our observation in Perelman because Sweda 
brought this suit under § 1132(a)(2) on behalf of the Plan.  
11 No action may be commenced under this subchapter 
with respect to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty, 
or obligation under this part, or with respect to a violation of 
this part, after the earlier of-- 
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which 
constituted a part of the breach or violation, or (B) in the 
case of an omission the latest date on which the fiduciary 
could have cured the breach or violation, or 
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff 
had actual knowledge of the breach or violation; 
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such action 
may be commenced not later than six years after the date of 
discovery of such breach or violation. 29 U.S.C. § 1113.  
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C. Section 1106(a)(1) claims (Counts II, IV, and VI)  
1. Elements of a claim under § 1106(a)(1)    
Section 1106(a) supplements the fiduciary duties by 
specifically prohibiting certain transactions between plans and 
parties in interest. The elements of a party-in-interest, 
prohibited transaction claim are: (1) the fiduciary causes (2) a 
listed transaction to occur (3) between the plan and a party in 
interest. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1). ERISA defines “party in 
interest” as “a person providing services to such plan.” 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B). Sweda argues that TIAA-CREF and 
Vanguard are parties in interest according to the plain language 
of § 1002(14)(B). She also points to a Department of Labor 
advisory opinion holding that a life insurance company that 
provided recordkeeping and related services to a retirement 
plan would be a party in interest under the statute. See DOL 
Advisory Opinion 2013-03A, 2013 WL 3546834. Importantly, 
an investment company does not become a party in interest 
merely because a plan invests in securities issued by the 
investment company. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B).  
 Fiduciaries are prohibited from causing a plan to engage 
in the transactions listed at § 1106(a)(1). Those transactions 
are:  
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of 
any property between the plan and 
a party in interest; (B) lending of 
money or other extension of credit 
between the plan and a party in 
interest; (C) furnishing of goods, 
services, or facilities between the 
plan and a party in interest; (D) 
transfer to, or use by or for the 
benefit of a party in interest, of any 
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assets of the plan; or (E) 
acquisition, on behalf of the plan, 
of any employer security or 
employer real property in violation 
of section 1107(a) of this title.  
Between the definition of service providers as parties in 
interest, id. § 1002(14)(B), and this exhaustive list of 
prohibited transactions, § 1106(a)(1) could be read to have an 
extremely broad application. Some courts have embraced that 
breadth and interpreted § 1106(a)(1) to prohibit almost any 
transaction with a party in interest. The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, has held that § 1106(a)(1) creates a per se rule against 
party in interest transactions, so that plaintiffs who allege such 
transactions may do so without even pleading 
unreasonableness of fees. Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 
F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016). In Allen, the Seventh Circuit 
ruled that the exemptions from prohibited transactions, under 
29 U.S.C. § 1108, are affirmative defenses, and that 
“plaintiff[s] ha[ve] no duty to negate any or all of them” in a 
complaint. Id. It also noted that five other circuits (the Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth) have ruled similarly. Id. See 
Braden, 588 F.3d at 600-01 (plaintiff did not have to plead 
facts “raising a plausible inference that the payments were 
unreasonable” because exemption in § 1108 is a defense raised 
by defendant). Responding to concerns about a flood of 
prohibited transaction claims, the Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that Rule 11 sanctions and reasonable risk aversion would 
prevent the floodgates from opening. Allen, 835 F.3d at 677.  
 We decline to read § 1106(a)(1) as the Seventh Circuit 
does because it is improbable that § 1106(a)(1), which was 
designed to prevent “transactions deemed likely to injure the . 
. . plan” and “self-dealing,” Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc., 700 F.3d at 92 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), would prohibit 
 30 
ubiquitous service transactions and require a fiduciary to plead 
reasonableness as an affirmative defense under § 1108 to avoid 
suit. Not even Sweda advocates for such a broad reading of 
§ 1106(a)(1), conceding in her complaint that “paying for 
recordkeeping with asset-based revenue sharing is not [a] per 
se violation of ERISA.” Am. Compl. ¶101. One of the reasons 
we do not find Allen persuasive is that the transactions the 
Seventh Circuit scrutinized in Allen were a far cry from the 
ordinary service arrangements at issue here. In Allen, an ESOP 
fiduciary bought the employer’s stock using a loan financed by 
the principal shareholders of the company. The value of the 
stock then fell so drastically that “[t]he Plan’s participants, all 
employees of [the company], wound up being on the hook for 
interest payments on the loan.” Allen, 835 F.3d at 673. A 
transaction of that variety is far removed from ordinary 
recordkeeping arrangements. Therefore, Allen does not 
provide sufficient justification to recognize a per se rule that 
every furnishing of goods or services between a plan and party 
in interest is a prohibited transaction under § 1106(a)(1). 
 Our ruling today does not conflict with our earlier 
decisions holding that transactions between a plan and plan 
fiduciaries are per se prohibited under § 1106(b). See Cutaiar, 
590 F.2d at 528; see also Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc., 700 F.3d at 94. 
In Cutaiar, we held that “[w]hen identical trustees of two 
employee benefit plans whose participants and beneficiaries 
are not identical effect a loan between the plans without a 
[§ 1108] exemption, a per se violation of ERISA exists” under 
§ 1106(b)(2). 590 F.2d at 529. In National Security Systems, 
we held that a transaction between a plan and fiduciary that is 
tainted by self-dealing is a per se violation of § 1106(b)(3) 
“regardless of the reasonableness of compensation.” 700 F.3d 
at 93. Those cases do not control here because § 1106(a) and 
(b) have distinct purposes: “[s]ubsection (a) erects a 
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categorical bar to transactions between the plan and a ‘party in 
interest’ deemed likely to injure the plan,” and “[s]ubsection 
(b) prohibits plan fiduciaries from entering into transactions 
with the plan tainted by conflict-of-interest and self-dealing 
concerns.” Id. at 82. The protective function of ERISA is at its 
height in the latter scenario when there is a risk of fiduciary 
self-dealing. The instances where participants might benefit 
from a transaction between a plan and a fiduciary are so rare 
that they can be prohibited outright.  
Reading § 1106(a)(1) as a per se rule barring all 
transactions between a plan and party in interest would miss 
the balance that Congress struck in ERISA, because it would 
expose fiduciaries to liability for every transaction whereby 
services are rendered to the plan. See Renfro, 671 F.3d at 321 
(“In enacting ERISA, Congress ‘resolved innumerable 
disputes between powerful competing interests—not all in 
favor of potential plaintiffs.’” (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993))). Additionally, if we 
interpreted § 1106(a)(1) to prohibit every transaction for 
services to a plan, we would have to ignore other parts of the 
statute. For instance, ERISA specifically acknowledges that 
certain services are necessary to administer plans. See 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii). Interpreting § 1106(a)(1) to 
prohibit necessary services would be absurd, and when one 
interpretation of a statute leads to an absurd result, we may 
consider an alternative interpretation that avoids the absurdity. 
Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. 
Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999)). Therefore 
we decline to interpret § 1106(a)(1) as prohibiting per se the 
“furnishing of goods [or] services,” 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), 
by all “person[s] providing services to [the] plan,” id. 
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§ 1002(14)(B).12  
The Supreme Court similarly avoided absurdity in its 
interpretation of § 1106(a)(1) in Lockheed Corp. (addressing 
whether the administrator of a plan could condition payment 
on performance by participants). The Court held that payments 
of benefits to a participant, which under a hyper-literal reading 
of the statute could be understood as “a transfer to, or use by 
or for the benefit of a party in interest, of any assets of the 
plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D), was not a prohibited 
transaction. Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 892-93. The Supreme 
Court rejected the hyper-literal reading because it would have 
been absurd and illogical in the context of the statute. Id. The 
Court went through the subsections of § 1106(a)(1), listing the 
different statutorily prohibited transactions, and explained that 
they follow a common thread: they are all “commercial 
bargains that present a special risk of plan underfunding 
because they are struck with plan insiders, presumably not at 
arm’s length.” Id. at 893. The Court distinguished payment of 
plan benefits because they “cannot reasonably be said to share 
that characteristic.” Id.  
We have interpreted § 1106(a)(1)(D) similarly, holding 
that a violation occurs when: (1) a fiduciary, (2) causes a plan 
to engage in a transaction, (3) that uses plan assets, (4) for the 
                                              
12 Moreover, § 1106(a) was not designed to prevent 
negotiation between unaffiliated parties. See Lockheed Corp. 
v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 893 (1996). Thus, if a service provider 
has no prior relationship with a plan before entering a service 
agreement, the service provider is not a party in interest at the 
time of the agreement. As explained herein, it only becomes a 
party in interest after the initial transaction occurs, and 
subsequent transactions are not prohibited absent self-dealing 
or disloyal conduct. 
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benefit of a party in interest, and (5) “the fiduciary ‘knows or 
should know’ that elements three and four are satisfied.” Reich 
v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 278 (3d Cir. 1995). In Reich, we held 
that specific intent is required because of the plain meaning of 
the statutory phrase “for the benefit,” and also because if 
§ 1106(a)(1)(D) did not require “subjective intent to benefit a 
party in interest, [it] would produce unreasonable 
consequences that we feel confident Congress could not have 
wanted.” Id. at 279.  
The Supreme Court’s identification of the common 
thread in § 1106(a)(1), a special risk to the plan from a 
transaction presumably not at arm’s length—and its 
determination that transactions that do not share that common 
thread are permissible—as well as our interpretation of 
§ 1106(a)(1)(D), represent a more harmonious way to interpret 
the prohibited transactions listed in § 1106(a)(1) in the context 
of the statute as a whole. The element of intent to benefit a 
party in interest effects the purpose of § 1106(a)(1), which is 
to rout out transactions that benefit such parties at the expense 
of participants. Section 1106(a)(1) is not meant to impede 
necessary service transactions, but rather transactions that 
present legitimate risks to participants and beneficiaries such 
as “securities purchases or sales by a plan to manipulate the 
price of the security to the advantage of a party-in-interest.” 
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 127 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 308) (alteration 
omitted). We therefore hold that absent factual allegations that 
support an element of intent to benefit a party in interest, a 
plaintiff does not plausibly allege that a “transaction that 
constitutes a direct or indirect . . . furnishing of goods, services, 
or facilities between the plan and a party in interest” prohibited 
by § 1106(a)(1)(C) has occurred. Requiring plaintiffs to allege 
facts supporting this element avoids absurdity in interpreting 
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the statute.   
2. Conclusory and well-pleaded factual allegations of 
prohibited transactions 
 The factual allegations that Sweda included in her 
complaint to support her claims for prohibited transactions 
overlap with the allegations supporting her fiduciary breach 
claims. Besides the allegations recounted above, Sweda 
alleged that revenue sharing was “kicked back” to TIAA-
CREF for recordkeeping associated with TIAA-CREF options. 
Am. Compl. ¶109. She alleged that Penn “allowed TIAA’s 
financial interest to dictate the Plan’s investment selections and 
recordkeeping arrangement.” Am. Compl. ¶87. She also 
alleged that Penn failed to act in the exclusive interest of 
participants, instead “serv[ing] TIAA-CREF’s and Vanguard’s 
financial interests” with decisions such as “allowing TIAA-
CREF and Vanguard to put their proprietary investments in the 
Plan without scrutinizing those providers’ financial interest.” 
Am. Compl. ¶¶112, 200. These general allegations about 
kickbacks and prioritizing TIAA-CREF and Vanguard’s 
financial interests over the participant and beneficiaries’ 
financial interests are largely conclusory, but we also consider 
well-pleaded factual allegations summarized at § III.B.3 that 
are relevant to Sweda’s prohibited transaction claims.  
3. Sweda failed to plausibly state a claim under Counts 
II, IV, and VI 
 Looking at the totality of the allegations in the 
complaint, taken as true, Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787, Sweda 
failed to state a plausible claim for prohibited transactions in 
Counts II, IV, and VI. 
a. Count II  
 In Count II, Sweda alleged that a prohibited transaction 
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occurred when Penn allowed TIAA-CREF to require inclusion 
of CREF Stock and Money Market accounts among the Plan’s 
investment options and agreed to TIAA-CREF recordkeeping 
services, pursuant to a “lock-in” agreement. Am. Compl. ¶193. 
Two of Sweda’s prohibited transaction claims emanate from 
this agreement: (1) that a prohibited transaction occurred at the 
time of the initial agreement, and (2) that a prohibited 
transaction occurred every time fees were later paid pursuant 
to the agreement. As to the initial agreement, Sweda did not 
sufficiently allege that TIAA-CREF was a party in interest at 
that time: she included no allegation that TIAA-CREF was 
“providing services to [the] plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B). 
Because Sweda failed to allege that TIAA-CREF was a party 
in interest at the time of the “lock-in,” that element is factually 
unsupported, and she failed to state a claim for the first alleged 
prohibited transaction in Count II. Sweda’s second claim in 
Count II that prohibited transactions occurred every time 
property was exchanged or services were rendered pursuant to 
the “lock-in” agreement is so closely related to Count IV 
(payment of recordkeeping fees) that we will address these 
claims together.    
b. Counts II and IV 
 In Counts II and IV, Sweda alleged that Penn caused the 
Plan to enter prohibited transactions when it caused the Plan to 
pay administrative fees to TIAA-CREF and Vanguard. Sweda 
plausibly alleged that TIAA-CREF and Vanguard were parties 
in interest under § 1002(14)(B) because they provided services 
to the plan at the time fees were paid, and Penn’s own Plan 
materials identify TIAA-CREF and Vanguard as parties in 
interest. At the pleadings stage, we must assume that this well-
pleaded fact is true. Next we look to whether Penn caused the 
Plan to enter a prohibited transaction with TIAA-CREF or 
Vanguard for administrative fees. Sweda alleged that the 
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administrative fee payments constituted prohibited 
transactions under § 1106(a)(1) in three ways: (1) they were 
prohibited transfers of property under § 1106(a)(1)(A), (2) they 
were transfers of assets under subsection (D), and (3) they 
constituted furnishing of services under subsection (C). We 
first address whether Sweda plausibly alleged that 
administrative fee payment by revenue sharing constituted a 
transfer of property under (A) or Plan assets under (D).  
 Sweda alleged that administrative fees were paid by 
revenue sharing. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46, 110 (Vanguard is 
“compensated for recordkeeping services based on internal 
revenue sharing it receives from the Vanguard Investor share 
class mutual funds.”). She also alleged that investment fees 
were drawn from mutual fund assets. Am. Compl. ¶44. 
(“Mutual fund fees are usually expressed as a percentage of 
assets under management . . . [t]he fees deducted from a mutual 
fund’s assets . . .”). Mutual fund assets are distinct from Plan 
assets, because, under the statute, assets of “a plan which 
invests in any security issued by an investment company” do 
not “include any assets of such investment company.” 29 
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 584 (With 
support from the Department of Labor, defendants 
demonstrated that revenue sharing fees did not impinge plan 
assets because they were drawn from the assets of mutual 
funds). Therefore, Sweda did not plausibly allege that revenue 
sharing involved a transfer of Plan property or assets under 
§ 1106(a)(1)(A) or (D), and furthermore, Sweda did not 
plausibly allege that Penn had subjective intent to benefit a 
TIAA-CREF or Vanguard by a use or transfer of Plan assets, 
which, under our precedent, is required to state a claim under 
§ 1106(a)(1)(D). Reich, 57 F.3d at 279.  
 Finally, we must address whether a prohibited 
transaction occurred under § 1106(a)(1)(C), the prohibition of 
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“furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan 
and a party in interest.” As we explained above, it is possible 
to read subsection (C) to create a per se prohibited transaction 
rule forbidding service arrangements between a plan and a 
party rendering services to the plan. However, because reading 
§ 1106(a)(1)(C) to that end would be absurd, Sweda must plead 
an element of intent to benefit the party in interest. After 
striking conclusory allegations, such as “Defendants served 
TIAA-CREF’s and Vanguard’s financial interests” (Am. 
Compl. ¶112) from the complaint, we do not find that Sweda 
alleged facts showing that Penn intended to benefit TIAA-
CREF or Vanguard. We will affirm the dismissal of Sweda’s 
claims for prohibited transactions under Counts II and IV. 
c. Count VI  
 At Count VI, Sweda alleged that Penn caused the Plan 
to engage in prohibited transactions when it caused the Plan to 
pay investment fees to TIAA-CREF and Vanguard. For similar 
reasons that Sweda did not plausibly allege prohibited 
transactions in Counts II and IV, she also failed to plausibly 
allege prohibited transactions in Count VI. First, Sweda did not 
plausibly allege that payment of investment fees constituted a 
prohibited transaction under § 1106(a)(1)(A), because Sweda 
alleged that investment fees were drawn from mutual fund 
assets, not Plan assets. Second, for the same reason, investment 
fees were not plausibly alleged to be a transfer of assets of the 
Plan under § 1106(a)(1)(D). Third, Sweda did not allege that 
Penn intended to benefit TIAA-CREF or Vanguard under 
§ 1106(a)(1)(D), as required by our precedent. Reich, 57 F.3d 
at 279. Finally, as we explained above in our discussion of 
Counts II and IV, in order to state a claim for prohibited 
transactions under § 1106(a)(1)(C), “furnishing goods, 
services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest,” 
a plaintiff must allege intent to benefit a party in interest. 
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Sweda failed to do so. Therefore, we will affirm the dismissal 
of the claim for prohibited transactions under Count VI.  
IV. 
 Sweda plausibly alleged that Penn failed to conform to 
the high standard required of plan fiduciaries under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1). However, she did not plausibly allege that Penn 
caused the Plan to enter prohibited transactions under 
§ 1106(a)(1). We therefore will REVERSE the portion of the 
District Court’s order granting the Appellees’ motion to 
dismiss Counts III and V and remand for further proceedings. 
We will AFFIRM the District Court’s order dismissing Counts 
I, II, IV, VI, and VII.  
  
Sweda v. University of Pennsylvania,  
No. 17-3244  
 
 
ROTH, Senior Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
Like many large employers, the University of 
Pennsylvania maintains a retirement plan for its employees.  
Between 2009 and 2014, the plan’s assets increased in value 
by $1.6 billion, a 73% return on investment.  Despite this 
increase, plaintiffs have filed a putative class action, claiming 
that the plan’s fiduciaries have imprudently managed it and 
seeking tens of millions of dollars of damages.  Having 
convinced this Court to reverse in part the District Court’s 
dismissal of the action, the plaintiffs will continue to pursue 
their remaining claims, which will be litigated extensively, at 
large cost to the university.  As a result, the university is in an 
unenviable position, in which it has every incentive to settle 
quickly to avoid (1) expensive discovery and further motion 
practice, (2) potential individual liability for named 
fiduciaries,1 and (3) the prospect of damages calculations, after 
lengthy litigation, with interest-inflated liability totals.  
 
This pressure to settle increases with the size of the plan, 
regardless of the merits of the case.  Alleged mismanagement 
of a $400,000 plan will expose fiduciaries to less liability than 
mismanagement of a $4 billion plan.  Thus, notwithstanding 
the strength of the claims, a plaintiff’s attorney, seeking a large 
fee, will target a plan that holds abundant assets.  I am 
                                              
1 Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kwasny, 853 F.3d 87, 91–92 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  
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concerned that this is the case both here and in numerous other 
lawsuits that have targeted large corporations and universities 
that administer some of the largest retirement plans in the 
country.2   
 
This strategy has substantial consequences for 
fiduciaries of these plans, particularly at universities.  While 
the fiduciaries for large corporations may have experience in 
dealing with potential liabilities, fiduciaries at universities are 
often staff members who volunteer to serve in these roles.3  
Even though indemnification agreements exist for these 
individual members, as long as they are party to the suit they 
will be required to disclose this litigation in personal financial 
transactions.4  Moreover, universities, which unlike large 
                                              
2 For a representative sample of cases plaintiffs’ counsel has 
brought against corporations and universities respectively, see 
infra notes 26–27. 
3 While this suit does not name the members of the Investment 
Committee as defendants, and the record does not specify the 
members of the Investment Committee or their roles within the 
university, other suits name staff members as individual 
defendants.  E.g., Tracey v. Mass. Inst. Of Tech., No. 16-11620, 
2017 WL 4453541 (Aug. 31, 2017), adopted in part and 
rejected in part, 2017 WL 4478239 (Oct. 4, 2017).  
4 See Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 16-cv-6525, 2018 WL 
1088019, at *1 (Jan. 19, 2018) (“Plaintiffs shall address why 
they need to name 29 additional individuals as defendants other 
than (a) they think they can; and (b) the assertion of multi-
million dollar claims against these individuals who served on 
a committee at their employer’s request has the tremendous 
power to harass these individuals because they will be required 
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corporations are not typically in the business of profitmaking, 
must keep in mind, when determining how best to proceed in 
litigation, that the university will be responsible for any 
damages award.  This reality demands that cases such as this 
one be carefully scrutinized in order not to permit implausible 
allegations to result in a large settlement, under which a 
substantial portion of the funds that are to be reimbursed to 
retirement plans are instead diverted to attorneys’ fees.  
 
Ultimately, this case presents a question virtually 
identical to the one addressed by this Court seven years ago, in 
Renfro v. Unisys Corp.5:  Does an ERISA plan fiduciary acting 
in good faith, under the prudent person standard, have a duty 
to do more than provide a wide, reasonable, and low-cost 
variety of investment options for individual plan beneficiaries 
who want to have control over their own investment portfolio?  
Plaintiffs contend that because the pleadings have identified 
specific problematic funds in the mix and range offered by 
defendants, the answer should be yes.  The majority agrees, 
holding that the administrators of a pension plan must ensure 
that sophisticated investors receive the best version of each 
plan available.  This departs from the core principles in Renfro, 
set out above, which the District Court followed faithfully.  For 
these reasons, I would affirm in full the District Court’s 
dismissal of the amended complaint. 
  
                                              
to list the lawsuit on every auto, mortgage or student financial 
aid application they file.”). 
5 671 F.3d 314, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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I 
The Plan, as explained by the District Court, is a 
defined-contribution plan that offers its beneficiaries four 
levels of involvement in their investments.  The first tier is a 
“do-it-for-me” tier, where investors have their choice between 
a TIAA target fund and a Vanguard target fund, which funds 
automatically adjust their investment strategy with no input 
from the beneficiary, based on an expected retirement date.  
Tier 2 is a “help-me-do-it” tier, which allows a beneficiary to 
select from a group of eight options and weigh them as 
preferred.  The third tier is a “mix-my-own” tier, which 
provides a few options for each of nine types of funds.  And 
finally, Tier 4 is a “self-directed” tier, which provides access 
to the full panoply of 78 funds offered by defendants.6  
 
Of these 78 investment options, virtually all are mutual 
funds.  Over the course of the class period, the proportion of 
retail-class mutual funds, as opposed to cheaper institutional-
class mutual funds, has varied.  Appellants have specifically 
challenged 58 of these retail-class funds as having had cheaper 
but otherwise identical institutional-class analogues at some 
point during the class period (Count V).  Defendants note in 
this connection that dozens of funds have been switched to 
institutional classes over time.  Plaintiffs also challenge the 
method in which fees are calculated (Count III), stating that an 
asset-based calculation has overcompensated the record 
keepers and that a failure to negotiate rebates constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  
 
                                              
6 Before October 2012, forty additional funds were included in 
this tier, for a total of 118.  
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At argument, when asked about the four separate tiers 
of beneficiary involvement, plaintiffs stated that the funds 
being challenged were largely related to Tiers 3 and 4, and in 
a follow-up response, specifically excluded Tier 1 from the 
scope of the complaint.  
 
II 
 It is well established that ERISA was intended to be a 
“comprehensive and reticulated” statute7 enacted after “a 
decade of congressional study of the Nation’s private 
employee benefit system.”8  ERISA “resolved innumerable 
disputes between powerful competing interests—a balance 
between encouraging the creation of plans and ensuring 
enforcement of rights under a plan.”9  Congress intended to 
create a system “that is [not] so complex that administrative 
costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers 
from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.”10  Instead, 
ERISA’s purpose is, in part, to “assur[e] a predictable set of 
                                              
7 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 
209 (2002). 
8 Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life 
Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Mertens v. 
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)); accord Renfro v. 
Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2011). 
9 Renfro, 671 F.3d at 321 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Mertens, 508 
U.S. at 262).   
10 Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010) (quoting 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)); see also Fifth 
Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2470 (2014) 
(“Congress sought to encourage the creation of [employee 
stock ownership plans].”).  
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liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a 
uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and awards when 
a violation has occurred.”11  
  
 Plaintiffs’ counsel, “one of the few firms handling 
ERISA class actions such as this,”12 have brought numerous 
ERISA suits across the country.  While these cases were at first 
limited to corporate retirement plans,13 they have expanded to 
include several suits against university retirement plans.14  
These cases typically are not litigated to conclusion, either 
                                              
11 Id. (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 
355, 379 (2002)).  
12 Beesley v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 06-CV-703, 2014 WL 
375432, at *3 (Jan. 31, 2014).  
13 E.g., Renfro, 671 F.3d at 314; accord Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 
831 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2016); Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 
327 (4th Cir. 2014); Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th 
Cir. 2009). 
14 E.g., Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 16-CV-6525, 2019 
WL 275827 (Jan. 22, 2019) (considering class certification 
motion); Divane v. Nw. Univ., No. 16-CV-8157, 2018 WL 
1942649 (Apr. 25, 2018) (considering defendants’ motion to 
strike jury demand), appeal filed (July 18, 2018); Clark v. Duke 
Univ., No. 16-CV-1044, 2018 WL 1801946 (Apr. 13, 2018) 
(considering class certification motion); Tracey v. Mass. Inst. 
of Tech., No. 16-11620, 2017 WL 4478239 (Oct. 4, 2017) 
(considering motion to dismiss); Cates v. Trs. Of Columbia 
Univ., No. 16-CV-6524, 2017 WL 3724296 (Aug. 28, 2017) 
(considering motion to dismiss); Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., No. 
16-cv-6284, 2017 WL 3701482 (Aug. 25, 2017) (considering 
motion to dismiss).  
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terminating through settlement or a judicial finding against the 
plaintiffs.   
 
 Given that these cases are brought as putative class 
actions, counsel is able to petition the court for fees after a 
successful settlement.  In cases of successful settlements, 
counsel, upon petition, are often awarded one third of the 
settlement amount, plus expenses, from the settlement fund.15  
While benefits to the plan may result from the settlement, they 
are substantially diluted by the fees’ calculation, even before 
considering the litigation costs that the universities shoulder 
through the motion to dismiss stage.  Indeed, while there is no 
comprehensive listing of “jumbo plans” maintained in this 
country, this pattern of bringing class actions against large 
funds seems to have sustained itself and could continue as long 
as more plans can be identified.  
 
Such a result would be the opposite of “assuring a 
predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of 
primary conduct.”16  Indeed, it would not only discourage the 
offering of these plans, but it would also discourage 
                                              
15 See, e.g., Krueger v. Ameriprise Fin., No. 11-CV-2781, 2015 
WL 4246879, at *4 (July 13, 2015) (approving 33 1/3% fees 
and additional costs totaling 36% of the common fund); Nolte 
v. Cigna Corp., No. 07-CV-2046, 2013 WL 12242015, at *4 
(Oct. 15, 2013) (approving 33 1/3% fees and additional costs 
totaling 36% of the common fund); George v. Kraft Foods 
Global, Inc., No. 08-CV-3799, 2012 WL 13089487, at *4 
(June 26, 2012) (approving 33 1/3% fees and additional costs 
totaling 49% of the common fund);   
16 Conkright, 559 U.S. at 517.  
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“individuals from serving as fiduciaries.”17  Therefore, in 
enforcing the pleading standards under Twombly and Iqbal, 
courts must take great care to allow only plausible, rather than 
possible, claims to withstand a motion to dismiss.18  While the 
majority takes great care to lay out the pleading standards that 
govern this dispute, for the reasons stated below, I disagree that 
those standards have been met.  
 
 The majority cites Fifth Third Bancorp v. 
Dudenhoeffer19 to support discarding any concern of 
encouraging attorney-driven litigation, despite its 
“appreciation of Penn and amici’s fear of frivolous 
litigation.”20  But Fifth Third concerned an employee stock 
ownership plan, under which employees invested primarily in 
the stock of their employer, a plan that the majority points out 
is subject to distinct duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).21  The 
defendants in that case were arguing for a special presumption 
that investments in the employer’s stock would be prudent 
unless the employer was in dire financial straits.22  No such 
                                              
17 Id. 
18 To the extent that amici, including the American Council on 
Education, address this point, I find it persuasive.  More 
importantly, I also believe that this consideration is consistent 
with the holding in Renfro.  The majority’s primary response 
to this argument of amici is that defendants’ alternative would 
foreclose ERISA liability for any plan with a mix and range of 
options.  I will address this below.  See infra Part IV. 
19 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014).  
20 Maj. Op. at 25. 
21 Fifth Third, 134 S. Ct. at 2463, 2467.  
22 Id. at 2466. 
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presumption is necessary here to determine under Renfro that 
plaintiffs’ claims were properly dismissed.   
 
 For the above reasons, I conclude that the District 
Court’s analysis of this case, following Renfro, was the correct 
one. 
 
III 
Turning then to a more pragmatic concern with the 
pleading here, ERISA states that a civil action may be brought 
“by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary.”23  This statutory edict, however, does not override 
the constitutional requirements for standing.24  In order for a 
plaintiff to carry her burden of establishing constitutional 
standing,25 three elements must be met:  (1) an injury in fact 
“that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, as 
opposed to conjectural or hypothetical”, (2) a causal 
connection between that injury and the conduct so that the 
                                              
23 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). 
24 Perelman v. Perelman, 793 F.3d 368, 373–74 (3d Cir. 2015).  
As the majority points out, Perelman is a defined-benefit case 
brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and a footnote in 
Perelman does approve of representative suits by plan 
participants or beneficiaries under § 1132(a)(2).  The issue in 
the instant case, however, is that we do not have sufficient 
information about the putative representatives to determine 
whether the harms they are claiming, which do not implicate 
every Plan participant, have affected them specifically. 
25 “The burden of establishing standing lies with the plaintiff.”  
Id. at 373 (citing Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 
2009)). 
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injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s action, and (3) “it 
must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”26  We have held that 
“an ERISA beneficiary suffers an injury-in-fact . . . when a 
defendant allegedly breaches its fiduciary duty, profits from 
the breach, and the beneficiary, as opposed to the plan, has an 
individual right to the profit.”27  
 
Plaintiffs allege that the Plan’s use of the 58 retail-class 
funds that had cheaper institutional-class analogues caused an 
injury in fact sufficient to confer standing for Count V.  They 
do not, however, automatically have an individual right to the 
alleged lost profits simply because they are participants in the 
Plan broadly.  At argument, plaintiffs specifically conceded 
that Tier 1 did not include any of the 58 funds challenged in 
Count V; plaintiffs limited their focus in Count V to Tiers 3 
and 4.  Therefore, in order for plaintiffs to carry the burden of 
proof that they were injured by the selection of the 58 retail-
class funds, they must plead that they were participants in Tier 
3 or Tier 4.  They have not done so here.  
 
The amended complaint does not contain facts that link 
any of the named plaintiffs to any tier at any point during the 
class period.  While a paragraph in the complaint is devoted to 
each of the six plaintiffs, each of those paragraphs consists of 
three sentences.  The first lists the plaintiff’s name and 
residence, the second states the plaintiff’s job title, and the third 
sentence is as follows, with changes only for gender:  “She is 
                                              
26 Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415 
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
27 Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
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a participant in the Plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) because she 
and her beneficiaries are or may become eligible to receive 
benefits under the Plan.”28  This averment indicates merely that 
plaintiffs are participants under the definition of § 1132(a)(2).  
It provides no information as to which tier, or tiers, any 
individual plaintiff chose for investment.  Indeed, the entire 
record contains no direct information on this point.  Plaintiffs 
conceded this at oral argument.  The “standing” portion of the 
amended complaint does imply that plaintiffs invested in ways 
consistent with being in a more active investment tier, but it 
does so by alleging generally that “the named Plaintiffs and all 
participants in the Plan suffered financial harm” as a result of 
defendants conduct alleged in Count V. 29  This cannot be 
sufficient.30    
 
This language in the amended complaint appears to 
mirror its citation to LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs. to 
support standing here.31  However, LaRue does not save 
plaintiffs.  The two situations in LaRue that the Supreme Court 
                                              
28 App. 39–40. 
29 App. 36 ¶ 8(a); see, e.g., Emergency Physicians of St. Clare’s 
v. United Health Care, No. 14-CV-404, 2014 WL 7404563, at 
*4 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2014) (dismissing plaintiff’s ERISA suit 
due to lack of standing under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) as the 
complaint would have required the district court to read 
additional implied details into a complaint). 
30 As the majority opinion states, an investor is not confined to 
a single tier.  This does not change the fact that no information 
is provided in the complaint that allows us to identify whether 
any of the appellees invested in either a relevant fund or a 
relevant tier.  
31 552 U.S. 248 (2008). 
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held to constitute cognizable claims under § 1132(a)(2) were 
instances when “a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets 
payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or . . . to persons 
tied to particular individual accounts.”32  The latter justification 
is identical to our test above, and as counsel conceded at 
argument, the plan’s system of tiers included at least one tier, 
Tier 1, that was not alleged to have been affected by retail-class 
investments, rendering the former justification inapplicable.  
As a result, I would affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Count V.33  
 
If this were the only deficiency in plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint, the appropriate remedy would be to dismiss Count 
V without prejudice to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to allege 
sufficient facts regarding the tiers they invested in.  However, 
for the reasons below, I believe that dismissing Count V 
without prejudice would be futile because plaintiffs have 
otherwise failed to plead a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.34  
 
IV 
                                              
32 Id. at 256 (emphasis added). 
33 Count III’s allegation of excessive overall recordkeeping 
fees implicates all participants and thus survives this analysis, 
but it still fails for the reasons stated in Part V below.  
34 “Leave to amend is properly denied if amendment would be 
futile, i.e., if the proposed complaint could not ‘withstand a 
renewed motion to dismiss.’”  City of Cambridge Retirement 
Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 
863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
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In Renfro v. Unisys Corp., we evaluated a similar 
complaint at the same stage in litigation, and determined that 
the mix and range of investment options in the retirement plan 
provided by Unisys was sufficient to demonstrate that the 
defendants’ fiduciary duty had been met.35  Despite a greater 
mix and range of options in the instant case, the majority 
believes that the standards that foreclosed the plaintiffs’ 
arguments in Renfro do not do so here.  However, a close look 
at the facts indicates that plaintiffs’ arguments under both 
Counts III and V are the same as, if not in fact weaker than, in 
Renfro.   
   
I will turn to Count V first.  Three fact patterns were 
presented in Renfro:  the facts surrounding the Unisys plan as 
well as facts from two cases we considered from other circuits 
with opposite outcomes.  In Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a motion 
to dismiss, as the plan at issue contained only thirteen 
investment options and was alleged to be part of a kickback 
scheme.36  In contrast, in Hecker v. Deere & Co., the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint against a plan 
with twenty-three mutual fund options and a third-party service 
that provided beneficiaries access to hundreds more.37  The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that it was implausible that this 
structure did not grant beneficiaries sufficient investment 
                                              
35 671 F.3d 314, 325–28 (3d Cir. 2011).  
36 588 F.3d 585, 589–90, 596 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Renfro, 
671 F.3d at 327. 
37 556 F.3d 575, 578–79, 586 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Renfro, 
671 F.3d at 326–27. 
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choices, as the fees on each of these options ranged from 0.07% 
to 1% across all funds.38  
In Renfro, the Unisys plan included 73 distinct 
investment options,39 71 of which were specifically named in 
the operative complaint as having excessive fees.  Fees among 
the investment options in the Unisys plan ranged from 0.1% to 
1.21%.  We held that since the allegations solely contested the 
fees charged in the Unisys plan, we could not “infer from what 
is alleged that the process was flawed,”40 and we affirmed the 
dismissal of the excessive investment fees claim.41  
 
In the instant case, the Plan has had a minimum of 78 
investment options during the class period, 58 of which are 
specifically contested in the amended complaint. Fees among 
these options in the Plan range from 0.04% to 0.87%.  Despite 
plaintiffs’ claims that these fees are excessive, their attempts to 
distinguish Renfro boil down to the level of detail in the 
complaint rather than, for example, any change in market 
circumstances that might render this 0.04% to 0.87% range 
excessively high today.  While the question of fiduciary breach 
does not boil down to a numerical calculation, plaintiffs do not 
contest that the Plan has a greater number of investment 
options than the Unisys plan and that the highest and lowest 
fees charged by Plan funds are both lower than in Renfro.  It is 
therefore difficult to see, in the absence of additional 
allegations regarding market circumstances or fiduciary 
misconduct, how this claim could be plausible if the claims in 
Renfro were not. 
                                              
38 Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586.  
39 671 F.3d at 327. 
40 Renfro, 671 F.3d at 327 (quoting Braden, 588 F.3d at 596).  
41 Id. at 328.  
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The majority believes that endorsing this reasoning 
would allow a fiduciary to “avoid liability by stocking a plan 
with hundreds of options, even if the majority were overpriced 
or underperforming.”42  This oversimplifies the analysis in 
Renfro, which afforded substantial weight in its discussion of 
Braden to allegations of a kickback scheme.43  If coupled with 
other allegations of mismanagement, a plan flooded with 
hundreds of options might itself be evidence of an imprudently 
clumsy attempt at fiduciary compliance or a distraction from 
bad-faith dealings.  
 
In the instant case, plaintiffs do not allege any such 
schemes.  Even their prohibited transaction claims, which the 
majority properly dismissed, derive from an “extremely broad” 
reading of 29 U.S.C. § 1106 rather than any self-interest on the 
part of the fiduciaries.  Without more, the Count V challenge 
to the Plan is neatly circumscribed by Renfro, regardless of the 
level of specificity devoted to the pleadings.44  
 
Moreover, plaintiffs’ admission that the challenged 
funds are primarily offered to Tiers 3 and 4 compels this 
outcome.  If the challenged funds were being provided in Tier 
                                              
42 Maj. Op. at 16. 
43 See Renfro, 671 F.3d at 327 (“Unlike the pleadings in 
Braden, plaintiffs have not contended there was any sort of 
concealed kickback scheme . . . .”). 
44 The majority’s reliance on Tibble v. Edison International, 
843 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Tibble IV”), is misplaced.  To 
the extent that Tibble IV, a Ninth Circuit case, contradicts an 
opinion of the Third Circuit in Renfro, it cannot apply in this 
case.  
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1—that is, to investors who wished to have their investments 
managed for them—the selection of more expensive share 
classes in a large portion of the fund would be concerning.  
However, since Tiers 3 and 4 attract investors who have a more 
sophisticated understanding of investment options and, 
inversely, are unlikely to attract investors who might be easily 
confused by the available investments, the overall mix and 
range of options is not disturbed by the fact that only the retail-
class option was available for a proportion of the funds in these 
tiers.  The majority stresses the importance of “Penn’s ‘conduct 
in arriving at an investment decision’”45 but fails to mention 
that twenty funds were switched from retail-class shares to 
institutional-class shares between 2011 and 2016, a shift that 
demonstrates that defendants, in choosing investment options, 
were not deliberately ignoring the benefits of institutional-class 
shares. 
 
The majority alternatively suggests that this analysis is 
too singularly focused on numerical performance or on 
allegations of misconduct.  But both cannot be true 
simultaneously.  A plausible allegation of either kind at the 
pleading stage would be sufficient to defeat a motion to 
dismiss, but plaintiffs here have not plausibly alleged either.  I 
would therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Count 
V. 
 
V 
 The plain text of Renfro also mandates that plaintiffs’ 
Count III claim regarding the method of calculating fees must 
fail.  In rejecting a similar, albeit less thoroughly pled, 
                                              
45 Maj. Op. at 21 n.7. 
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excessive fees claim, we stated that the Renfro plaintiffs’ 
“allegations concerning fees are directed exclusively to the fee 
structure and are limited to contentions that Unisys should have 
paid per-participant fees rather than fees based on a percentage 
of assets in the plan.”46  This is an exact description of Count 
III, and the parallel logic is apparent between the two 
complaints, even if the amended complaint here is 
supplemented with more concrete numbers than the Renfro 
complaint.  The allegations that failed in Renfro must fail here 
also.   
 
 The majority relies solely on Tussey v. ABB, Inc.47 to 
demonstrate that claims involving excessive recordkeeping 
fees can survive a motion to dismiss.  This reliance is improper.  
The Eighth Circuit noted that “unlike” cases like Renfro, 
Tussey “involve[d] significant allegations of wrongdoing, 
including allegations that ABB used revenue sharing to benefit 
ABB and Fidelity at the Plan’s expense.”48  Plaintiffs had 
proven, during a bench trial, that ABB had been explicitly 
warned about the excessiveness of their revenue sharing 
agreement and had failed to act in any way upon that warning.49  
                                              
46 671 F.3d at 327. 
47 746 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 2014).  
48 Tussey, 746 F.3d at 336.  
49 Id. (“The district court found, as a matter of fact, that the 
ABB fiduciaries [failed to take curative steps] even after 
ABB’s own outside consultant notified ABB the Plan was 
overpaying for recordkeeping and might be subsidizing ABB’s 
other corporate services.”). 
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No such facts are alleged here, and as such, plaintiffs’ Count 
III claim must fail.50   
 
VI 
For these reasons, I would affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of all counts of the amended complaint.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal of Counts III and V of the amended 
complaint. 
                                              
50 To the extent the majority attempts to rely on DOL Advisory 
Opinion 2013-03A to support its position that revenue sharing 
reimbursements might be necessary to satisfy the prudent man 
standard, this reliance is also misplaced.  The quoted language 
in the advisory opinion merely opines on what a fiduciary must 
do during revenue sharing negotiations in order to satisfy the 
prudent man standard.  DOL Advisory Opinion 2013-03A, 
2013 WL 3546834, at *4 (“Prudence requires that a plan 
fiduciary, prior to entering into such an arrangement, will 
understand the formula, methodology and assumptions used by 
Principal . . . following disclosure by Principal of all relevant 
information pertaining to the proposed arrangement.”). 
